Opinion | The Collision Course: Analyzing the Deepening Divide Between Pakistan and the Taliban

The strategic partnership between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban, long regarded as the keystone of Islamabad's regional strategy, has spectacularly unraveled, setting its two neighbors back into a vicious cycle of cross-border aggression and hostility. This deterioration is rooted in inherently incompatible expectations, divergent national interests, and the Taliban's transition from a proxy force to an independent government.

Pakistan's relationship with the Taliban had taken decades to develop. Since the group's formation in the 1990s, Pakistan's intelligence and military establishment, especially the ISI, extended vital assistance—sanctuary, training, weapons, and logistical support. This activity continued after the US invasion in 2001, with Pakistan engaged in a "double game" as a nominal US ally while surreptitiously facilitating the Taliban resurgence. The ultimate goal was "strategic depth"—having a friendly, compliant regime in Kabul to check Indian influence and safeguard Pakistan's western border.

The Taliban's takeover in August 2021 was initially hailed in Islamabad as the final achievement of this objective. Yet the hoped-for strategic dividend soon became a strategic nightmare. Rather than cracking down against the anti-Pakistan Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the Afghan Taliban gave the outfit a safe haven. The TTP, having deep ideological, ethnic, and historical ties with the Afghan Taliban, raised its game inside Pakistan, leading to a horrific spurt in casualties. For Pakistan, it has become an existential national security crisis, augmented by a faltering economy and political instability.

The Taliban, now ruling a bankrupt and isolated state, values most its sovereignty and independence. They see Pakistan's efforts to dictate policy, especially on the TTP, as a violation of their hard-fought autonomy. This declaration of Afghan nationalism is the primary catalyst for the divide. Additionally, the Taliban are hesitant to turn against their ideological cousins, as they fear it would undermine their base and provide an entry for competitors such as the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP).

Other hotspots fuel the conflict. The contested Durand Line border is an ever-present problem, and Pakistan's attempts to fence it were met with violent opposition from the Taliban, who regard it as an illegitimate partition of Pashtun territory. Cross-border clashes are common. Although Pakistan has a definitive military superiority, the Taliban have asymmetrical tools of influence, i.e., the ability for their top leader to make a fatwa that can trigger instability even inside Pakistan itself.

The fallout has local implications. The tense relationship provides India with a chance to re-engage with Kabul diplomatically and economically, defeating one of the primary Pakistani goals. China's increasing interaction with the Taliban government adds a further complication, likely reducing Pakistan's leverage.

De-escalation is desparately needed yet continues to escape them. Each side is dug in, with Pakistan launching airstrikes into Afghan territory and the Taliban refusing to disown the TTP. Mediation by trusted Muslim states such as Qatar and Saudi Arabia has the best chance of leading to a dialogue, given their previous success in facilitating temporary ceasefires. But a sustainable solution calls for a radical change: Pakistan needs to drop its policy of looking for a client state in Afghanistan and devise a foreign policy free from its obsession with its confrontation with India, while the Taliban needs to address the security fears of the neighboring country. Without this, the area is in for a long spell of instability, verifying the saying that Pakistan is now harvesting the bitter fruits of the proxy armies it had sown.